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Abstract 
We develop a simple human capital model for optimum schooling length when earnings 
are stochastic, and highlight the pivotal role of risk attitudes and the schooling gradient of 
earnings risk. We use Spanish data to document the gradient and to estimate individual 
response to earnings risk in deciding on attending university education, by measuring risk 
as the residual variance in regional earnings functions. We find that the basic response is 
negative but that in households with lower risk aversion, the response will be dampened 
substantially and may even be reversed to positive.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There can be no doubt that schooling is a risky investment. An individual deciding on 
schooling is at best imperfectly aware of her abilities, the demands of the school 
curriculum, the probability to succeed, the nature of the job that may be obtained after 
completing an education and the position within the post-school earnings distribution 
that may be attained. Neither can there be any doubt that the relation of these 
uncertainties with schooling decisions and outcomes is under-researched, although 
recently this literature seems to be taking off.  
 
The literature starts with Levhari and Weiss (1974), with Eaton and Rosen (1980),  
Kodde (1985) and  Jacobs (2002) building on their model. Levhari and Weiss introduce 
a two-period model, with work in period 2 and a choice between time devoted to school 
and to work in period 1. The pay-off to school time is uncertain, but revealed at the 
beginning of period 2. Increasing risk (increasing variance in the pay-off to school time) 
reduces investment in education if good states of the world generate higher marginal 
returns to education.1  
 
Williams (1979) is the first to apply a stochastic dynamic programming model to 
education decisions, and to link up with the finance literature on marketable investment. 
The production of human capital, the depreciation of human capital and future wages 
are all stochastic. Again, higher risk, as larger variance in the production of human 
capital from given inputs, reduces investment in schooling, unless risk aversion is very 
                                                 
1 Kodde (1985) identifies an additional, implicit, requirement for this result.  
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strong and the covariance between depreciation and production of human capital is 
highly negative. Belzil and Hansen (2002) estimate a stochastic dynamic programming 
model on data from the NLSY 1979-1990, assuming a model with constant relative risk 
aversion (estimated at 0.928). They conclude from their estimates that an increase in 
risk (variance of labour earnings) increases schooling length. This happens because 
increased risk in the labour market makes schooling more attractive as this comes with 
receiving more riskless parental income support. The elasticity, at 0.07, is quite small 
though.  
 
Hogan and Walker (2001) construct a stochastic dynamic programming model where 
being in school has utility value, and the shadow wage, to be realised when leaving 
school, follows a Brownian motion. Once the student leaves school, this shadow wage 
becomes the fixed wage for the entire working life. Increasing risk in the post-school 
wage implies an increase in the upside risk, the probability to obtain a high wage, while 
the increase in downside risk remains ineffective, because at low wage students stay in 
school anyway. As a results, individuals react by staying in school longer as risk 
increases.   
 
The models differ somewhat in the concept of risk, but essentially they all consider the 
effect of changes in the variance of the post-school wage. The predictions are different 
though: increased risk may increase or decrease the length of schooling. The differences 
can be explained from differences in model structure, each highlighting different 
channels through which risk appears. Obviously, risk has many faces, and individuals 
can react in many ways. In this paper, we develop probably the simplest model possible 
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to analyse the effect of stochastic post-school earnings on the desired length of 
schooling, showing the key role of essential risk parameters and risk attitudes in a 
simple elegant formula. We will then estimate the sensitivity of schooling decisions to 
variance in post-school earnings, by including regional observations on residual 
earnings variance in a probit for the decision to attend university education in Spain. 
The results show a negative effect of risk on investment, dampened by increasing taste 
for risk.  
 
2. Length of education with stochastic earnings 
 
2.1 A simple formula 
 
Suppose, an individual faces potential earnings, depending on realized schooling s, in a 
simple multiplicative stochastic specification. 
θst stY Ys=  (1) 
where  is earnings at age t for given schooling length s,  is a non-stochastic shift 
parameter and θ  is a stochastic variable.
stY sY
st
2 For a start, simplify to θ =θst s and 
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sθ  is a stochastic shock around Y  with a single lifetime realisation, but with variance 
dependent on schooling length s. This simple specification is similar in spirit to Levhari 
and Weiss’s two period model, with a wage unknown when deciding on schooling, but 
,s
                                                 
,2 We might specify earnings at age t for schooling s as Y t  reflecting dependence on 
experience rather than age. However, since we assume 
,t s s− ≥
,st sYY =  i.e. constant wages over 
experience, this is immaterial. 
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with a single lifetime realisation (one wage rate for the entire post-school period). Chen 
(2001) argues that transitory shocks are less important because they can be averaged out 
over one’s lifetime, while permanent shocks persist; she finds, for the US, that 
permanent shocks account for 50 to 60% of unexplained earnings variance of high 
school and college educated workers. Baker and Solon (2003) find, in a long panel for 
Canada, that permanent shocks account for about two thirds of the inequality in annual 
earnings. As individuals cannot insure this risk, write the individual objective as 
maximum expected lifetime utility, discounted at rate ρ 
{ } ( )1θ θ
ρ
t s
s s s ss
W E U Y e dt e E U Yρ ρ
∞ − −= =   ∫   (3) 
Apply a second-order Taylor series expansion around Y  and write s
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Then, rewrite the objective function as 
( ) ( ) ( )2 " 21 1max!W s σ
2 2
s
s s ss s
e U Y Y U Yρ−  = +    
(5) 
Setting the derivative to s equal to zero, ignoring a term with ( )sY'"U  and rewriting a 
little yields as optimum condition 
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Hence, is the marginal rate of return to schooling, is the relative gradient of risk to 
schooling, is relative risk aversion and is the income elasticity of utility. To 
understand this expression, note 
sµ sγ
sα sε
 
• if 0σσ 2 =∂
∂=
s
s
s  and ε , we have the standard condition of the core Becker-
Mincer model, with investment up to the point where discount rate and marginal 
rate of return are equal. These conditions specify a riskless world and lifetime 
earnings maximization. 
1=s
• if 0σσ 2 =∂
∂=
s
s
s  and , we have the modification of utility maximization rather 
than earnings maximization. 
1ε ≠s
• if individuals are risk neutral ( )0α =s  we have the same result as when there is no 
risk ( )salls ,0σ 2 = .3 
 
The second-order condition for an optimum requires the left-hand side of equation (6) to 
be a downward sloping function of s. By consequence, anything that shifts the curve 
upwards has a positive effect on optimum schooling (which occurs at intersection with the 
                                                 
3 Note that  implies U”= 0, hence U’ is constant, or   0α =s .1ε =s
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zero-axis and is shifted to the right), and anything that shifts the curve down reduces 
optimum schooling. 
 
Effects of risk on demand for education length depend crucially on risk attitude α and 
on the term in the inner brackets. If this term is positive 
s



 >+ ρ
2
1γµ ss , an increase in 
risk, at constant risk gradient, will reduce optimum schooling for risk averters ( ) 
and increase it for risk lovers. However, if risk strongly falls with education 
0α >s


 −< ss µρ2
1γ  the conclusion is reversed. An increase in the risk gradient reduces 
optimum schooling length for risk averters and increases it for risk lovers. Note that 
even the effect of increased returns to education µ  interacts with risk attitude. An 
increase in returns will only increase optimum schooling length if α  Strongly 
risk averse individuals may use the increased returns to shy away from further risky 
investments. The schooling gradient of risk plays an important role in predicting 
outcomes, but is seldom analysed, in spite of the fact that at least crude non-
standardised data are widely available. It calls for a search for empirical regularities (cf 
Hartog, Van Ophem and Raita, 2003). 
s
.σ/1 2ss <
 
2.2 Generalisation 
 
We will now develop a very general result, subject to only one substantial restriction. We 
will assume that stochastic shocks to earnings at different ages are uncorrelated. Correlated 
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shocks will probably not affect the key result that with risk aversion, investment will be 
lower when risk increases, while the reverse holds for risk lovers. 
 
Assume a general earnings profile θ where is non-stochastic and is the 
stochastic shock at age t, for given education s, with 
stst Y stY stθ
( )θ 1 , ,stE all= s t  (11)
( ){ }2 2θ θ σst stE E− = st  (12)
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 (13)
As before, the individual is assumed to maximize expected lifetime utility 
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because of independent errors. Applying, as before, a second-order Taylor series 
expansion, we get 
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Setting the first derivative of W to s equal to zero, in a similar development as the 
derivation of (6), including ignoring a term with U  yields the condition '"
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Now, we have essentially the same result as before.4 As the second order condition 
requires we know that ,0/W 22 <∂∂ ss ss ∂∂ /W
2σ ss
is declining in s. Then, as before, a 
positive effect of some variable on the derivative increases optimal education (the 
intersection of the curve with the zero axis), a negative effect decreases optimal 
education. The conclusions are slightly different from those of the simpler case, but 
important results remain. And now of course conclusions pertain to age-specific 
variables and parameters, rather than single lifetime values. A sign reversal of α , from 
risk aversion to risk loving, switches the sign of the effect of changes in variance σ  
and in risk gradient . A change in , variance at the start of working life, has a 
different effect than a change in a later year: it adds a positive term for risk averters, a 
negative term for risk lovers. An increase in later variance (t > s), reduces optimum 
schooling lengths for risk averters, unless the slope gradient annihilates the effect of the 
rate of return (
st
2
st
stγ
γµ < )0+ stst . An increase in the schooling gradient of risk will have a 
negative effect on schooling length for risk averters. Note that indeed risk averters may 
be induced to lengthen their schooling if the schooling gradient of risk is sufficiently 
negative. Our key general conclusion remains: the sensitivity to risk depends essentially 
on risk attitudes and there is an important role for the schooling gradient of risk. The 
first conclusion is no surprise, although existing models do not all allow for a full range 
                                                 
4 Note, as before, that earnings maximisation implies unitary elasticity, = 0, U’st = 1. With 
income independent of age, the standard Mincer condition returns.  
stα
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of risk attitudes. The second conclusion indicates that empirical work is needed to 
establish the nature and determinants of the schooling gradient of earnings risk. 
 
Needless to say our model is simpler and more restrictive than the dynamic programming 
models that are being developed. In particular, our assumption that individuals commit 
once and for all to an optimum schooling length ignores that individuals may adjust plans 
as they advance through education, and indeed, with growing information will see their 
risk from ignorance reduced. But our model has the virtue of highlighting the role of key 
parameters, and thus provide a useful frame for empirical analyses. Generalising the model 
to a correlated variance structure over time has no priority, as we do not anticipate 
surprises from it. 
 
3. Cross-section estimates for Spain 
 
3.1 Basic specification 
 
Both the survey of the literature and the model developed above indicate that the effect 
of post-schooling earnings variance on demand for schooling length is not unambiguous 
and will depend on the schooling gradient of risk and on risk attitudes. Hence, empirical 
work is needed to establish this sensitivity. We will explain the decision to continue 
education at the university level or not after completing secondary education. Among 
the explanatory variables we include return, the ratio of lifetime earnings with 
university or secondary education, and risk, the ratio of residual earnings variances 
between the two educations. Both are measured at the level of an individual’s region of 
residence.  
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In the Spanish system of education in the later 1980’s and early 1990’s5, compulsory 
primary education was usually completed at ages 13-14. Children who complete it 
without a diploma can only continue in lower vocational schools. Those who complete 
with a diploma almost all choose high school. After lower secondary (lower vocational 
or high school), individuals can leave the educational system if they want and start 
working. Most usual is to continue, from lower to upper vocational and from high 
school to pre-university. Almost 100% of those who complete pre-university attend 
higher education. Among students completing upper vocational, most of them start 
working and a very small fraction attend higher education; they have a smaller range of 
degrees to choose from. The normal age to complete secondary education and attend 
higher education was 17-18 years old. Students who have decided to attend higher 
education can choose a short university degree (3 years college) or a long university 
degree (5 years college-this is a bachelor). Individuals who have completed the short-
cycle may start working or they can complete the long cycle in 2 or 3 years more 
(depending on the short degree completed and the long degree selected). The age to 
complete the short degree was 20-21 and the long degree 22-23. 
 
Our empirical strategy has two stages. We estimate earnings functions within regions, 
separately for secondary educated and university educated workers. From these we 
derive regional measures of returns to university education µ and the risk gradient γ (the 
ratio of residual earnings variance for university graduates’ relative to secondary school 
graduates). We use these regional measures as explanatory variables in a probit model 
for college attendance of youth. All information is taken from the same dataset, the 
                                                 
5 We refer to these years, since individuals in our sample deciding whether to attend higher 
education make the choice during this period. 
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Spanish Family Budget Survey EPF 1990/91, a nationally representative survey among 
21155 households, collecting information on all 72123 individual household members. 
The survey respondents are pensioners, unemployed, workers and any individual living 
in the household aged 16 and above. In our sample, 7400 individuals out of the 72123 
respondents are wage earners possessing secondary (4486) or higher education (2914). 
We use these observations to estimate earnings functions separately for university and 
secondary education in an individual’s region of residence as a simple quadratic 
function of potential experience (age minus education) and a dummy for gender 
(alternative specifications of the earnings function will be discussed below; see 
Appendix A for definitions and specifications)6. There are 18 Autonomous Regions in 
Spain. We have kept the specification of the earnings function deliberately sparse. 
Several potential variables that may have an impact are not known to the individual 
when deciding on university attendance. Other variables are allowed to have an impact 
only in the participation decision for reasons of identification (this holds in particular 
for the family background variables, which are known to have a small effect on earnings 
anyway). We approximate the regional rate of return to university education by dividing 
discounted lifetime earnings with university education by discounted lifetime earnings 
with secondary education, with age-specific annual earnings derived from the estimated 
earnings functions. We put the discount rate at 3.5%. Regional risk is measured as the 
ratio of the residual variance in the region from the earnings function for the university 
educated to the residual variance for the secondary educated7.  
                                                 
6 We applied OLS, since variables to correct for selectivity and endogeneity bias are not available. 
However, in related work including a Heckman correction had little effect (see Diaz-Serrano, 
2001).    
7 More precisely: it is the variance of the exponential of the estimated residuals in the log earnings 
function.  
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The resulting estimates of returns and risk, as the counterparts to µ and γ used in 
equation (6), are presented in Table 1. The lifetime earnings mark-up for university 
education varies between 1.19 and 1.74 for men and between 1.21 and 1.91 for women. 
Dividing by a length of education of 5 years would give a crude return per year of 
education between 3.8 and 18.2 percent; the latter is on the high side, but otherwise the 
returns are comparable to what has been reported in the international literature. Values 
for γ below 1 dominate, with a lower earnings risk for university than for secondary 
education. Thus in most Spanish regions university education reduces risk. International 
evidence on the relationship between level of education and risk is conflicting: there is 
no universal positive or negative slope (Hartog, van Ophem and Bajdechi, 2003).   
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
We apply a probit model to estimate the probability to attend higher education once 
secondary education has been completed: the endogenous variable takes the value one if 
the individual possessing secondary education is attending higher education and zero 
otherwise. To estimate our choice equation we construct a sample of young aged between 
17-23, with secondary education completed. As we mention at the beginning of this 
section, 17-18 years old is the usual age to complete secondary education and attending 
college, whereas 22-23 years old is the usual age of higher education completion. We only 
include individuals in the sample of young if they are registered as member of the parental 
household (sons and daughters). It is quite common in Spain for youth in the given age 
bracket to live with their parents, no matter whether they work or go to school; we discuss 
possible selectivity bias in the next section. Our final sample of young contains 2501 
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observations, from whose 1521 are attending higher education and 980 do not, 1277 are 
males and 1224 are females.   
 
Relating educational decisions to earnings variables at the level of the residential region 
only makes sense if information at this level is the prime input in the decision. This is 
probably a fairly acceptable approach, as individuals generally collect information in their 
near environment. There may be individuals with a clear perspective on the region where 
they might hope to work after graduation, e.g. a youth growing up in poor Extremadura 
anticipating earnings consequences in wealthy Madrid as the dream destination for a 
career. While such effects cannot be ruled out, we assume the regional environment to 
dominate as the main source for expected earnings consequences of schooling. The 
assumption is at least partially supported by the fact that in Spain a small fraction of 
students attend university outside their own region. Moreover, it is strongly supported by 
information from a recent panel data set 8 with information on migration out of one’s 
region of birth. The data indicate that in the 1990’s among individuals with higher 
education some 5% have left their region of birth between the ages of 20 to 30. This is the 
group that may have left to go to university or have migrated soon after completing 
university. And they may have anticipated this, by considering pay-off to university 
education outside their own region. A better method to assess the pay-off to university 
education would then be a weighted average of the pay-off in the potential student’s own 
region and in the other regions, with weights given by the probabilities of migration 
destinations after college. But with total weight of these other regions, in the relevant age 
                                                 
8 We use the 1994-2000 waves for Spain of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
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bracket, restricted to 5%, one may hardly expect a substantial effect from such a 
refinement.   
 
We should also stress that we use contemporaneous information on returns and risk to 
explain the university participation decision. We firmly believe that this is a proper 
approach, reflecting the information individuals have available at the time of the 
decision. An alternative might be to use panel data for individuals’ earnings to extract 
information on returns and risk. The information might then be used to explain the 
schooling decision that individuals have taken in the past. This is a very strong 
assumption, as it implies that the information that we as researchers deduce from the 
individual’s post-school earnings profile was available to the individual when deciding 
on schooling. We think that the assumption of using contemporaneous information in 
the individuals’ environment is a much more reasonable approach. But of course, 
ultimately this can only be decided by proper empirical testing (for which at the 
moment we do not have the data). 
 
Our baseline probits are given in Table 2. They differ in the specification of the 
underlying earnings function: Model 1 has a dummy for gender, Model 2 has separate 
estimates by gender, and thus includes gender-specific slopes. Generally, Model 2 
would be preferable, but there is a cost in terms of small numbers of observations (see 
appendix A). Family characteristics have a conventional, and mostly highly significant 
effect on the probability to attend university after having completed secondary 
education. Family income, home ownership, parental education and occupation level 
have a positive effect, family size a negative effect. Urbanisation has a positive effect, 
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while city size has a positive effect except for the initial dip (the effect of both variables 
should be interpreted together). The variable called “job seeking” is the region’s 
average duration of unemployment so far for unemployed with a secondary education. It 
has a positive effect, which is understandable from lower opportunity cost.9 Although 
they are not displayed in Table 2, we also consider regional dummies. They are included 
in order to assess whether the effect of the variables computed by regions (e.g. return 
and risk) is real, or just picks up a pure regional effect. These regional fixed-effects are 
significant, and when they are included significance levels of the estimated coefficients 
for return and risk even increase, without significant effects on the magnitude of the 
coefficients. We conclude that differences between model 1 and 2 are not substantial.  
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
The key variables are the earnings ratio and the earnings variance (see appendix A for a 
detailed description of the variables). The earnings ratio has the expected positive effect, 
and significantly so. The earnings variance ratio has a negative effect, significant at 5% 
in model 1 and 10% in model 2.  Using the framework of equation (6) and (7), this 
indicates that risk aversion dominates the education decision for youth with completed 
secondary education, as there is a negative response to the schooling gradient of risk, 
i.e. the risk ratio between university and secondary education.10.  
                                                 
9 The results are essentially the same if we use the ratio of unemployment duration by education. 
10 If we include regional fixed effects in the probits, the coefficients for returns and risk are barely 
affected, while their t-ratio’s increase.  
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3.2. Assessing robustness 
 
We have tried to assess the robustness of our results in several ways. We have estimated 
two different specifications of the earnings functions. As can be seen in Table 1, there 
are some outliers in the explanatory variables. The risk ratio is exceptionally low for 
men in region 13 and exceptionally high for women in region 14. Region 13 is wealthy 
Madrid, region 14 is poor Murcia. We have no explanation for these outliers, but they 
do not drive the results. If we exclude them from our data set and re-estimate, the basic 
results retain, with returns and risk significant at 10% or better.   
 
A particular concern may be that our sample is based on a household survey and that we 
catch only youth living with their parents. One may fear a selectivity bias here, as one 
might think working youth to be more inclined to leave the parental household than 
youth still in school. However, this is generally not so in Spain. It is quite common for 
youth to live in the parental household until at least their mid-twenties11. As we needed 
information on parental background, we have restricted our youth sample to “sons and 
daughters”, 93% of the individuals aged 17-23 in our sample. This means that we have 
excluded 54 household heads, 50 spouses, 77 other relatives and 33 non-relatives of the 
household head. If selectivity is a problem it should arise from these exclusions, as the 
sample is representative of all households. Thus, we re-estimated our models without 
restriction to sons and daughters, adding a dummy for household head or spouse and 
interaction for the dummy and household income (for the case where income is own 
earned income, rather than the source for parental transfers). Extending the sample in 
                                                 
11 Some official Spanish statistics carried out by the National Statistics Bureau (INE) estimate this 
age at 29 years old at the end of the 1990’s. 
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this way, and thus including households of youth not living with their parents turns out 
to be immaterial.   
 
Finally, we consider the problem that really bothered us. Our key variables, returns and 
especially risk, are taken from the residuals in earnings functions and thus may be 
expected to contain measurement error. This may bias our estimated coefficients. In 
appendix B we measure to which extent our results may be affected by this problem. 
We conclude that this effect is probably modest. 
 
3.3. Allowing for heterogeneous risk attitudes 
 
It is quite unlikely that all individuals will have identical risk attitudes. In particular, the 
evidence from direct measurement such as based on reservation prices for lottery 
tickets, shows market variability between individuals (see Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Jonker, 2002, for evidence and references). Interestingly, the Spanish household 
survey, as an expenditure survey, has observations on expenditures on lottery tickets 
and other forms of gambling. Presumably, such expenditures reflect risk attitudes in the 
household. We created dummies to pick out households who spend more than x% of the 
annual family budget on lottery tickets, with x running from 1 to 5. As Appendix A 
(table 5) shows, the sample share so selected decreases from 32.4 to 7.2 %. We 
interacted the dummy with the variance ratio. Results are presented in Table 3. They are 
precisely in the expected direction, with a strong dampening of the negative effect of the 
risk gradient, and in fact, a sign reversal for those who spend relatively much on 
lotteries. Compared to the results in Table 2, the negative response to relative risk is 
quite stable as we use dummies for higher lottery shares. But for strong lottery addicted, 
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the countering positive effect becomes so strong that it even surpasses the primary 
effect and generates a positive balance: those who spend much on lotteries even react 
positively to increases in the risk ratio. This is strong support for one of our key 
predictions, i.e. a pivotal role for risk attitudes. 
 
Insert table 3 here 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The literature on the effect of uncertain returns to education on the decision to invest 
generates no unequivocal results. We have contributed to that literature by developing a 
simple basic investment model that lays out the pivotal role of risk attitudes and the 
schooling gradient of earnings risk in determining the sign of the relationship. Our 
estimates for Spain document the schooling risk gradient and support our conclusion on 
the importance of risk attitudes. We think that the basic model we have presented here is 
a very useful vehicle for more empirical work along these lines.  
 
The model we use, while generating essential insights, can certainly be improved by 
building on less restrictive assumptions. The most urgent candidate for change would be the 
assumption that individuals must make a single binding decision on their length of 
education. In that sense, dynamic optimisation models, where individuals adjust their 
decisions along the way, are more attractive. Yet, while no doubt providing interesting and 
relevant refinements, it is doubtful whether such modelling will substantially modify the 
conclusion on the key role of risk attitudes and the schooling gradient of earnings risk. 
Further empirical work seems more urgent, in particular seeking replication of the results 
reported here, and extending the set of observations on earnings risk.  
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Appendix A (definition of the variables) 
 
To estimate the Return and Risk used as covariates in our schooling choice model we 
first estimate the following Mincer wage equations 
 
2
ijk jk jk ijk jk ijk jk jk ijkY X X Gα β δ γ= + + + + u
u
 (21)
and  
2
ijkg jkg jkg ijkg jkg ijkg ijkgY X Xα β δ= + + +  (22)
where the subscript j refers to each one of the 18 regions, g refers to gender, and k to the 
schooling level (se-secondary education, he-higher education) the individual i belongs 
to. Y are gross yearly wages and X are potential years of experience. Table 4 reports 
sample sizes used to estimate earnings equation (21) and (22). 
 
Insert table 4 here 
 
In table 2, we refer to model 1 when risk and return are calculated from equation (21), 
and we refer to model 2 when they are calculated from (22). We define the return as the 
ratio of lifetime earnings between individuals possessing higher education and 
secondary education calculated by gender and region 
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where  are the estimated earnings from wage equation (21) or (22), r=0.035 is a the 
discount rate, and the superscript t refers to years of experience. We define risk as the 
yˆ
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ratio of the variance of the estimated residuals between individuals possessing higher 
and secondary education 
,
,
ˆvar( )
ˆvar( )
i he
jg
i se
Risk
ε
ε=  
(24)
where εˆ  is the exponential of the estimated residual from equation (21) or (22). Finally, 
to allow for heterogeneous risk attitudes we use the following variable 
 
*ijg jg iLottery Risk D=  (25)
where D is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the household i spends a given share of 
their incomes in gambling. The different shares of income expended in gambling are 
reported in table 5. Once Return, Risk and Lottery are estimated from earnings 
equations they are included as covariates in our probit schooling choice model. 
 
Insert table 5 here 
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Appendix B (effect of measurement errors) 
 
Consider the linear relationship 0y X β ε= + , where y can be an observed or latent 
variable, X contains the exogenous variables and ε a random error term. The problem 
arises when instead of X we observe Z, being Z X u= + , with u the measurement error. 
Consequently, when we estimate 0y Z β ε= + , we have that 0 0y X uβ β ε= − + . Then, 
OLS for the linear regression model, and ML estimation in the case of the probit will 
provide a biased estimation of β0  (the absolute value of the parameters will tend to be 
underestimated). The problem is similar to the case of endogenous regressors, and so, 
IV estimation is one of the most common solutions to deal with measurement errors, see 
e.g. Amemiya (1985) or Iwata (2000). Nevertheless, given the usual problem of the 
scarcity of appropriate instruments other ways to correct for errors-in-variables have 
been developed. For instance, one of the most common consists in the manipulation of 
the likelihood function, see e.g Li and Hsiao (2001). Others are based on the GMM (see 
e.g. Hong and Tamer, 2003), or in minimum distance estimators as Li (2000) and Hsiao 
(1989). In this appendix, we assess the possible consequences of measurement errors in 
our probit estimates. They generate the same results and we conclude that the impact is 
fairly modest.  
 
Define 2εσ , , var( )u uΣ = var( )X XΣ = , and var( )Z ZΣ = . According to equations 
written above Σ = . Therefore, the variance of the true exogenous variables X 
crucially depends on the variance of the measurement error u, which is unknown. This 
lack of knowledge of Σ
x zΣ − uΣ
u implies some identification problems that lead to an 
inconsistent estimation of β0 when the conventional ML estimation is used. If the 
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measurement error problem is ignored, the inconsistent estimation of β0 will converge to 
the following expression: 
2
u
2
x0
2
u
2
x
2
u
2
x
2
x0
1 σσβ+σ+σσ+σ
σβ=β  (26)
where 2xσ  and 2uσ  are the variance of the true regressor X and the measurement error u, 
respectively. In expression (26), β0 is the true parameter and β1 its inconsistent 
estimator. In absence of measurement error, that is u=0 and 2uσ =0, β0=β1. Expression 
(26) suggests that the greater measurement error u, the greater 2uσ . Therefore, the 
absolute value of β0 will tend to be underestimated. Under the presence of measurement 
errors we observe Z=X+u, and hence the variance of Z takes the following form 
. We know that due to measurement errors, a share of the variance of Z 
(known) is 
z xΣ + uΣ = Σ
ZΣ  and the remaining variance is uΣ . In order to assess the bias, we will 
make the following assumption  
(1 )
(1 )
Z X u Z
X Z
u Z
Zα α
α
α
Σ = Σ + Σ = Σ + − Σ
Σ = Σ
Σ = − Σ
 (27)
With no measurement errors (α=1), the variance of the true regressors X coincides with 
the variance of the observed Z. 
 
To evaluate the potential bias we just have to develop expression (26) that yields 
( )
2
x
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2
1
2
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2
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2
x1
0 2
4)(
σ
+σβ+σβσ+σβ=β  (28)
As β1 we take our probit estimations for return and risk in table 2. Under the presence of 
measurement errors, according to expression (28) and assumption (27), the theoretical 
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true value of β0 depends on α. Now, suppose that we interpret the results of Baker and 
Solon (2003) cited above, that permanent shocks count for two thirds of inequality and 
transitory shocks for one third, as indicative of the share of measurement errors and set 
the share of true variance α=0.7. Then, compared to the interpretation of no 
measurement errors (α=1), the effect is modest, as table 6 shows.  
 
Insert table 6 here 
 
According to expression (26), a consistent estimator of β0 can be achieved by applying 
the following transformation over Z (see Iwata, 1992) 
1ˆ ˆ ˆ
Z XX Z
−= Σ Σ  (29)
Conventional probit estimation using (29) provides consistent estimators. To estimate 
 we use again assumption (27). The results are reported in table 7. ˆ XΣ
 
Insert table 7 here 
 
In table 7 we also observe than not only the greater error measurement, the greater true 
value of the parameter, but also the greater variance. Both, estimated parameters and 
their variance rise at the same proportion, thus significance levels are unaffected.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Return and risk by region and gender. Earnings functions estimated according  
to equation (21)-model 1 and equation (22)-model 2 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Spanish Regions Return  Risk  Return  Risk 
 Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
1. Andalucia 1.556 1.859  0.341 0.470  1.532 1.963  0.341 0.470 
2. Aragon 1.336 1.361  1.196 0.855  1.273 1.510  1.196 0.855 
3. Asturias 1.277 1.365  0.912 1.274  1.328 0.759  0.912 1.274 
4. Baleares 1.263 1.214  1.161 0.706  1.243 1.427  1.161 0.706 
5. Canarias 1.632 1.726  0.449 0.584  1.648 2.112  0.449 0.584 
6. Cantabria 1.748 1.262  0.804 1.484  1.733 1.712  0.804 1.484 
7. Castilla-La Mancha 1.328 1.705  0.874 0.667  1.337 1.632  0.874 0.667 
8. Castilla-Leon 1.585 1.751  0.759 0.438  1.559 2.034  0.759 0.438 
9. Com. Valenciana 1.573 1.576  0.975 0.294  1.576 1.570  0.975 0.294 
10. Catalunya 1.370 1.592  0.614 1.068  1.294 1.924  0.614 1.068 
11. Extremadura 1.668 1.452  1.817 0.619  1.706 1.465  1.817 0.619 
12. Galicia 1.503 1.564  0.319 0.530  1.509 1.632  0.319 0.530 
13. Madrid 1.288 1.349  0.092 0.591  1.294 1.223  0.092 0.591 
14. Murcia 1.509 1.475  0.621 4.167  1.457 1.365  0.621 4.167 
15. Navarra 1.194 1.577  1.839 0.592  1.259 1.524  1.839 0.592 
16. Pais Vasco 1.561 1.690  0.771 0.702  1.563 1.696  0.771 0.702 
17. Rioja 1.575 1.910  1.880 1.442  1.450 2.405  1.880 1.442 
18. Ceuta-Melilla 1.320 1.860  0.598 0.345  1.406 0.963  0.598 0.345 
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TABLE 2 
 
Probit estimates of demand for higher education in Spain 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Coeff. Elasticity Z-value Coeff. Elasticity Z-value
Constant -4.0061 -4.75 -3.6437 -4.45
Return 0.6721 0.2534 3.46 0.3682 0.1389 2.94
Risk -0.1365 -0.0515 -2.20 -0.0850 -0.0320 -1.76
Household variables  
   Log(Household Income) 0.2169 0.0818 3.84 0.2160 0.0815 3.83
   Log(Household size) -0.5255 -0.1982 -5.01 -0.5312 -0.2003 -5.07
   Home Ownership 0.1241 0.0472 1.94 0.1201 0.0457 1.88
Household head education        
   Primary 0.2988 0.1131 3.61 0.2970 0.1124 3.59
   Secondary 0.6612 0.2192 5.75 0.6628 0.2197 5.76
   Degree (3-years college) 0.9894 0.2927 6.68 0.9702 0.2889 6.56
   Bachelor 1.3107 0.3512 8.05 1.3100 0.3512 8.03
Household head occupation  
   Manager (farming) 0.3667 0.1284 2.72 0.3619 0.1269 2.69
   Blue-Collar (farming) -0.1005 -0.0385 -0.63 -0.0969 -0.0371 -0.60
   Professionals (Ind.-Serv.) 0.1734 0.0639 2.21 0.1703 0.0628 2.17
   Manager (Ind.-Serv.) 0.4642 0.1623 3.97 0.4704 0.1643 4.01
   White-Collar (Ind.-Serv.) 0.2896 0.1052 3.79 0.2904 0.1055 3.80
   Not classified occupation 0.4242 0.1454 1.91 0.4167 0.1431 1.89
City size  
   10.000-50.000 -0.4013 -0.1564 -1.89 -0.4114 -0.1604 -1.95
   50.000-100.000 -0.4662 -0.1782 -2.25 -0.4828 -0.1845 -2.34
   100.000-500.000 -0.4371 -0.1704 -2.05 -0.4279 -0.1668 -2.01
   >500.000 -0.1123 -0.0428 -1.23 -0.1165 -0.0444 -1.28
Urbanization 0.4861 0.1853 2.61 0.4991 0.1903 2.69
Job seeking 0.1490 0.0562 1.86 0.1717 0.0648 2.15
Log-likelihood -1462.40  -1464.92 
Wald test 332.51  331.17 
Sample size 2501  2501 
Note: Probit estimates include dummies for region that are significant at 5% level or better. 
           Model 1: Return and risk variables estimated from equation (21); model 2: Return and  
           risk estimated from equation (22).
TABLE 3 
 
Probit estimates of demand for higher education controlling for  
heterogeneous attitudes towards risk 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Coefficient Elasticity z-value Coefficient Elasticity z-value
Return 0.6699 0.2526 3.45 0.3665 0.1382 2.93
Risk -0.1282 -0.0483 -1.87 -0.0783 -0.0295 -1.42
Lottery (1%) -0.0185 -0.0070 -0.28 -0.0136 -0.0051 -0.23
        
Return 0.6828 0.2575 3.51 0.3758 0.1417 3.00
Risk -0.1695 -0.0639 -2.64 -0.1152 -0.0435 -2.28
Lottery (2%) 0.1140 0.0430 1.53 0.0953 0.0360 1.43
        
Return 0.6729 0.2537 3.46 0.3697 0.1394 2.95
Risk -0.1693 -0.0638 -2.63 -0.1161 -0.0438 -2.28
Lottery (3%) 0.1806 0.0681 2.15 0.1649 0.0622 2.22
        
Return 0.6712 0.2530 3.45 0.3685 0.1390 2.94
Risk -0.1663 -0.0627 -2.60 -0.1136 -0.0428 -2.25
Lottery (4%) 0.1829 0.0690 1.96 0.1685 0.0635 2.08
        
Return 0.6671 0.2515 3.43 0.3651 0.1377 2.91
Risk -0.1474 -0.0556 -2.34 -0.0939 -0.0354 -1.90
Lottery (5%) 0.1592 0.0600 1.37 0.1295 0.0488 1.24
Note: Probit estimates include dummies for region that are significant at 5% level  
        or better. Model 1: return and risk variables estimated from equation (21);  
        model 2: return and risk  estimated from equation (22). 
        Variable lottery defined in equation (25) 
 
.
TABLE 4 
 
Sample sizes for the estimation of the earnings functions (21) and (22) 
 
Spanish Regions Men   Women  
 Secondary University Secondary University 
1. Andalucia 409 266 209 163 
2. Aragon 155 98 95 70 
3. Asturias 68 33 34 14 
4. Baleares 75 20 47 24 
5. Canarias 118 60 63 39 
6. Cantabria 67 29 40 17 
7. Castilla-La Mancha 385 253 205 210 
8. Castilla-Leon 176 109 75 103 
9. Com. Valenciana 306 168 183 94 
10. Catalunya 200 117 129 75 
11. Extremadura 67 52 34 40 
12. Galicia 219 105 117 94 
13. Madrid 152 98 81 64 
14. Murcia 70 31 35 27 
15. Navarra 78 44 40 27 
16. Pais Vasco 288 159 135 124 
17. Rioja 56 47 28 24 
18. Ceuta y Melilla 37 9 9 7 
Total 2,926 1,698 1,559 1,216 
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TABLE 5 
 
Number of individuals with a given % of yearly income spent in lotteries 
 
 % household income spent in gambling 
 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
# of individuals (sample size=2501) 810 517 337 239 180
% of the sample (sample size=2501) 32.4 20.7 13.5 9.6 7.2
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TABLE 6 
 
Estimates of β0, true value of the parameter, in expression 
(28) for different values of α in expression (27) 
 
 Model 1   Model 2  
α Return Risk  Return Risk 
1.0 0.6721 -0.1365  0.3682 -0.0850 
0.9 0.7476 -0.1515  0.4096 -0.0943 
0.8 0.8418 -0.1701  0.4614 -0.1059 
0.7 0.9631 -0.1941  0.5279 -0.1208 
0.6 1.1247 -0.2261  0.6166 -0.1407 
0.5 1.3510 -0.2709  0.7408 -0.1686 
Note: For α=1 estimated parameters coincide with our  
  estimates in table 2. Model 1: return and risk  
  variables estimated from equation (21); model 2: 
  return and risk  estimated from equation (22). 
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TABLE 7 
 
Probit estimates of demand for education in Spain applying transformed regression 
defined in expression (29) for different values of  α in expression (27) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Return  Risk  Return  Risk 
α  Coeff. Z-value  Coeff. Z-value  Coeff. Z-value  Coeff. Z-value
1 0.6721 3.46  -0.1365 -2.20  0.3682 2.94  -0.0850 -1.76 
0,9 0.7467 3.46  -0.1516 -2.20  0.4092 2.94  -0.0945 -1.76 
0,8 0.8401 3.46  -0.1706 -2.20  0.4603 2.94  -0.1062 -1.76 
0,7 0.9600 3.46  -0.1949 -2.20  0.5261 2.94  -0.1214 -1.76 
0,6 1.1201 3.46  -0.2275 -2.20  0.6138 2.94  -0.1416 -1.76 
0,5 1.3441 3.46  -0.2729 -2.20  0.7365 2.94  -0.1699 -1.76 
Note: Model 1: return and risk variables estimated from equation (21); model 2: return and  
           risk  estimated from equation (22). We use the same variables than in table 2, the   
           rest of coefficients remain unaltered.  
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